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Abstract 
 Microfinance has been heralded as the solution to global poverty by optimists in 
the development field.  Many regard the practice of extending unprecedented financial 
access to the poor through small loans as a necessary and important tool in the 
development process.  The industry has grown and changed shape over the last two 
decades and recently has come under fire.  The new face of microfinance has included 
for-profit lenders, usurious interest rates, loan sharks, and suicides.  Many critics are 
beginning to question the ethics, practices and efficacy of microfinance.  They claim that 
microfinance cannot make more than a marginal impact on poverty, and more serious 
development efforts should address structural causes of underdevelopment.  This paper 
will examine the effects microfinance on extreme poverty as defined by the poverty 
headcount ratio at $2 a day and $1.25 a day.  The study will focus on the Latin America 
and Caribbean.  Through regression analysis, this paper measures the effects of 
microfinance on the poverty rate while controlling for structural economic changes.  We 
will conclude that microfinance has a statistically significant effect on extreme poverty in 
this region.  These results are an important response to critics who posit that the costs of 
microfinance outweigh the benefits.  
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Microfinance and Poverty 
 Nearly half of the people in the world live in extreme poverty and survive on less 
than $2.50 a day.  1.4 billion of those people live on less than $1.25 a day (World Bank, 
2009).  In 2000, world leaders came together at the United Nations and pledged to work 
toward eliminating poverty by adopting the Millennium Development Goals.  The 
developing world has made progress on the goal of halving poverty and owes much of 
that success to microfinance.  Microfinance is the practice of providing much of the poor 
in the developing world with access to financial services they would otherwise be forced 
to do without.  The world’s poor operate almost exclusively in the informal sector, which 
generally involves subsistence living and informal savings, trading, and credit.  The rapid 
growth of the Microfinance industry over the last 40 years (and even more so last 10 
years) has helped fill the financial void for the world’s poor and ultimately reduce world 
poverty. 
 This paper will provide evidence supporting that microfinance has been effective 
in reducing poverty in Latin America.  First, we will examine the history and beginnings 
of microfinance, including why it is needed, how it functions, and how it has been 
changing in recent years.  Next, we will explore criticisms of microfinance that question 
the ethics and efficiency of the practice.  The final portion of this paper will include a 
case study of microfinance in Latin America.  Through OLS regression analysis, we will 
demonstrate the effects the growing microfinance movement has had and continues to 
have on poverty rates in the region.  Ultimately, the results will give credence to the 
claim that microfinance is an effective tool for reducing poverty in the developing world.   
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History 
The origins of microfinance as we know it today are rooted in the history of its 
founding father, Muhammad Yunus.  Yunus is often referred to as the “Banker to the 
Poor” after the title of his books by the same name.  Born in Bangladesh, he grew up 
surrounded by extreme poverty and the informal economy.  He went on to become a 
Fulbright scholar and earn a Ph.D. in Economics at Vanderbilt University before 
returning to his home country and getting involved in the fight against poverty (Yunus, 
2003). Inspired by the famine of 1974, Yunus committed his efforts to poverty alleviation 
and in 1976 traveled to Jobra where he loaned his first microcredits from his own 
pocket.1  Yunus loaned $27 to 42 women for a profit of $.02 on each loan. 
The success of his first loan to the poor women of Jobra and the desperate need 
for financial services in the village lead to Yunus’s creation of what would come to be 
named the Grameen Bank in 1976. 2  He received a loan from the government with which 
he made loans to the poor in Jobra and the concept quickly grew.  By 1982, the Grameen 
Bank was serving 28,000 members.  Since then these numbers have grown 
astronomically reaching 3.12 million members in 2003 and by 2009 was approaching 8 
million (Grameen Bank, 2011). 
 Around the same time Yunus was starting the microcredit movement in Asia, 
ACCION was beginning a similar movement halfway around the world in Latin America.  
In 1973, ACCION began extending microcredit to poor entrepreneurs in Recife, Brazil 
where the term “microcredit” was first used for a United Nations Project (Fiori, 
                                                
1 See “First loan he gave was $27 from own pocket.” (2006, October 14). The Daily Star. 
Front Page. 
2 Grameen Bank means Bank of the Villages in Bangla. 
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Goldmark, Assumpção, Darzé, & Cardoso, 2004).3  By 2001, ACCION estimated that 
there were over 17 million small and micro businesses using the financial services of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs).  Since its first implementations not 40 years ago, 
microfinance has exploded in popularity in the developing world and today there are over 
120 million accounts with MFIs worldwide (Christen, Rosenberg, & Jayadeva, 2004).  
 Apart from its obvious success in the developing world, microfinance has 
received increasing support from the international community.  The United Nations 
declared 2005 the International Year of Microcredit in praise of its continued work to 
bring financial services to the underserved poor.  UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
expressed the importance of microfinance to the developing world in a speech saying, 
“the greatest challenge before us is to address the constraints that exclude people from 
full participation in the financial sector” (Barr, Kumar, & Litan, 2007).  Microfinance 
directly addresses this challenge and continues to close the gap between the formal sector 
and the “unbankable” informal sector.  In 2006, the international community continued to 
laud the industry by awarding The Grameen Bank and its founder Muhammad Yunus the 
Nobel Peace Prize.4  Despite more recent criticism of microfinance, the industry 
continues to grow and reach underserved people in the poorest areas. 
Why do we Need Microfinance? 
 Much of the world’s poor live and function in the “informal economy.”  They do 
not hold formal wage-paying jobs and are forced to diversify their income among 
                                                
3 The United States House of Representatives may have first formally used the term 
“microfinance” or “microenterprise”. See The Library of Congress (H.R.5918.IH) 101st 
Congress. 
4 See Tom Wright, “Yunus says borrowers are core of Grameen Bank”, 2011 for Yunus’s 
take on his recent sacking from his position as managing director of the Grameen Bank. 
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different types of labor and entrepreneurship.  They lack access to savings accounts and 
formal credit.  Any lending that takes place among the poor are either among family and 
close friends or through usurious money lenders that charge extremely high interest rates. 
Why are the poor forced to live in this informal economy?  Formal sector banks 
refuse to lend to them.  The poor lack capital to use as collateral on loans, such as land or 
substantial consumer goods.  The banks would have nothing to seize if a borrower were 
to default.  The poor lack credit history, which would allow the banks to know the 
difference between a risky and safe loan.  Information regarding potential borrowers and 
their histories drives the formal banking market.  That is to say, in the poor communities 
of the developing world, there is too little reliable information for banks to take a gamble.  
Obtaining this information costs time and money.  People in the informal economy often 
live in rural areas, so for a bank to ensure against ex ante and ex post moral hazard, they 
must frequently send employees to monitor the financial activities of the borrowers.5  
Since they typically demand very small loan sizes (less than $100 or so) the banks cannot 
reasonably cover their costs through interest rates unless the rates are prohibitively high.  
For many formal banks it is simply not feasible or good business to take a chance on 
loaning to the “informal sector” (Barr et al., 2007). 
Microfinance incentivizes repayment. 
Microfinance has stepped in to fill this void of financial services for millions of 
people all over the world and has overcome many of the circumstances that restrict the 
participation of the formal banks in this niche market.  The microfinance industry has 
                                                
5 Ex ante moral hazard exists in microfinance when a borrower receives a loan and makes 
a riskier investment than was previously proposed.  Ex post moral hazard exists when a 
borrower’s investment is successful, but then reported as unsuccessful and default when 
they could actually make repayments (Di Mauro, 2002). 
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developed unique strategies that deal with the informational problems that have led to the 
exclusion of many from financial services.  Microfinance issues small and 
uncollateralized loans with an almost immediate repayment schedule.  Borrowers begin 
to repay their loan as soon as one week after receiving it and continue to make weekly or 
monthly repayments (Wright, 2000).  One of the important features of microfinance is the 
relationship built between the borrowers and the MFIs.  As borrowers make timely 
repayments and build credit history with the institutions, they are granted opportunities to 
increase the size of subsequent loans.  This feature is especially important for borrowers 
who use the loans for micro and small businesses.  As the size of the loans they are 
eligible for increases, microentrepreneurs can grow their businesses.  MFIs benefit from 
this feature because it builds incentives into the repayment structure.  Borrowers now 
have something to lose if they default; the opportunity for future loans. 
Group lending overcomes formal banks’ challenges. 
Group lending is another important mechanism for addressing the challenges of 
financial service extension to the poor.  Microfinance in Latin America uses the practice 
of group lending to hedge against the risk of default and to reduce monitoring costs.  
Potential borrowers form groups with four or so other potential borrowers and approach 
MFIs together.  These groups typically comprise neighbors and close family relatives that 
generally live near each other.  The MFI grants the first loan to one member of the group.  
Once that member repays her loan, but not before, the next member of the group receives 
her loan.  Each subsequent loan is contingent on the ability of the other members of the 
group to repay.  Group members assume responsibility for each other’s loans and pledge 
their personal liability for everyone’s loans.  If one person struggles to make a payment 
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on time, the rest of the group is forced to help make the payment on time or face losing 
future opportunities to borrow (Wright, 2000).   
This strategy has a number of built-in mechanisms that hedge against the 
problems that exist when lending to the informal sector.  The first feature is the 
collateralization of social-capital.  Since the groups formed typically comprise borrowers 
with close ties, such as neighbors and relatives, each member is putting their relationships 
with others in the group on the line for their loan.  There is a strong incentive to repay 
because default means that the individual cannot continue to borrow and her close friends 
and family suffer through her own fault.  The group lending structure turns social ties 
themselves into collateral.  Another feature of  group lending is the way it ensures only 
the best potential borrowers are approaching the MFI for a loan.  The group collective 
selects the other members, keeping in mind that the actions of their fellow members will 
determine whether or not the rest of the group can receive their loans.  This incentivizes 
people to form groups with people they believe are least likely to default.  MFIs avoid 
adverse selection because the groups minimize that risk before the first loan is granted 
(Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). 
Group lending also assumes the monitoring costs that would otherwise be the 
burden of the banks.  Ex ante moral hazard is protected against because the other 
members of the group are close enough to each other that they can monitor and impose 
pressures to ensure each member is not making riskier investments than they claimed 
they would.  Ex post moral hazard is avoided because the other members would know if 
someone is withholding returns on their investments and claiming they were 
unsuccessful.  The looming negative pressures from the group protect against 
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irresponsible behavior.  At the same time, the group can be viewed as a safety net for the 
members.  Each member wants the other members in the group to succeed because of 
both their close ties, and more importantly because of what their success or failure means 
to their personal ventures.  This fosters support among the group members for 
exchanging business advice and assisting each other when one member falls on hard 
times and struggles to repay her loan.  In this way, bailing one of the group members out 
is not an entirely selfish move, but rather is a function of the safety net the group 
structure builds for any one of the borrowers should they have a slow month (Wright, 
2000).   
A possible drawback to the group lending structure is that it may hamstring some 
lenders’ business growth.  Regardless of the group making payments on time, one 
borrower’s investments could be paying off very quickly and her need to expand 
becomes greater than that of the other members.  If this person were borrowing as an 
individual she could repay her loans very quickly and begin taking loans of larger size to 
accommodate her needs.  In the group lending structure, that borrower would have to 
wait to receive her loans longer than necessary and would have to increase her loan size 
incrementally and comparably with those of the rest of the members in the group.  
Microfinance overcomes structural obstacles. 
Formal banks may face other, more basic obstacles to lending to the poor.  Banks 
are simply not located within reasonable distance of those living in extreme poverty.  It is 
unreasonable for either lenders or borrowers to travel such great distances to make and 
monitor these transactions.  Additionally, financial literacy may make it difficult for 
many people to understand and obtain loans.  The poor are often poorly educated and 
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may have difficulty filling out the paperwork and understanding their responsibilities.  
Most formal banks are not in the business of financially educating the poor.  The roots of 
the lack of financial access lay as deeply as physical and educational obstacles (Klein, 
2008).   
Microfinance has also worked toward overcoming these problems.  At its 
inception, one of the primary goals of microfinance was to provide borrowers with 
financial and business advice.  MFIs aimed to provide their customers with financial 
training and work closely with them on business proposals.  These practices have largely 
taken a back seat to MFI expansion in an attempt to reach more people.  Through the 
1980s and 1990s, MFIs began to scale back the training and educating of their borrowers 
and focused more on efforts to reach a greater number of potential borrowers.  Both of 
these practices attempt to address some of the most basic shortcomings of financial 
access for the poor (Barr et al., 2007).  
New Face of Microfinance 
 Since the mid 1990s, microfinance has seen unprecedented growth in the number 
of institutions and borrowers.  Many countries in Latin America have seen almost 
exponential growth in the number of microfinance borrowers in the last decade or so.  As 
we see in Figure 1, the number of borrowers has been increasing fairly steadily with a 
few exceptions of recent tail-offs in Nicaragua, Ecuador and Brazil.  Argentina, 
Colombia and most Mexico continue to see dramatic increases in the number of 
microloan borrowers.   
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Figure 1.  Number of active microfinance borrowers in Latin America
Additionally, the number of borrowers as a proportion of the population has 
increased in most Latin American countries as seen in Figure 2.  The proportion of each 
country’s population that is a borrower of a microfinance loan is represented in each of 
these maps.  The darker blues represent a higher percentage of the population borrowing 
from MFIs.  As we can see, many of the countries in Latin America have experienced an 
increase in the percentage of their population using microloans. 
 These figures represent the growing trend of both microfinance institutions and 
formal banks expanding their services.  One of the chief goals of microfinance is to help 
the poor pull themselves out of poverty.  Since microfinance aims to provide the poor 
with services that the formal sector will not, poverty alleviation will lead to eventual 
formal access for those people. 
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Figure 2.  The maps show the proportions of the population borrowing microloans in 
Latin America in 1997 (left) and 2008 (right). 
 
So in theory, the mark of microfinance’s success will be when it puts itself out of 
business, having elevated the poor to a level where formal banks see them worth lending 
to.  Upgrading and downscaling are two financial sector changes that represent this 
theory coming to fruition.   
 Non-profit decide to upgrade. 
 Upgrading is the process of microfinance institutions “formalizing” their practices 
and operating more like traditional banks than NGOs.  This process is often done with the 
guidance or partnership of formal banks (Berger, Goldman, & Miller-Sanabria, 2006).  
Upgraded MFIs are regulated, monitored and held to the same standards as traditional 
banks in terms transparency and how they operate.  MFIs upgrade so that they can 
provide higher quality service to the poor and broaden their reach.  They are able to offer 
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a wider variety of financial services such as savings accounts and larger scale loans.  
Upgrading does not mean that the MFIs are shifting focus from the poor, but instead 
means that they are more capable of providing high quality services.  These MFIs benefit 
from greater funding and stability, but function as for-profit entities with double bottom 
lines (Berger et al., 2006).6  The willingness of the upgraded institutions to incorporate 
both profits and social mission into its operations demonstrates that is possible and can be 
profitable.       
 Widely regarded as the poster child for microfinance in Latin America, Banco 
Compartamos is one of the best examples of an NGO upgrading and formalizing its 
practices.  After becoming Mexico’s largest microfinance lender from 1990 to 2000, 
Compartamos “upgraded” to a for-profit institution in 2000.  At that time the bank had 
just over 60,000 borrowers.  Six years later Compartamos had over 600,000 borrowers 
and in 2007 went public.  The Mexico City-based bank started with an initial investment 
of $6 million and today is valued at more than $1.5 billion (Lewis, 2008).  Investors 
around the world are starting to see microfinance as a lucrative business opportunity and 
the industry is possibly starting to turn away from its original goal.     
 Formal banks decide to downscale.      
The unanticipated success of microfinance and the extremely low default rates (as 
small as 1% at the Grameen Bank) have attracted the attention of formal banks as well.  
Taking note of the returns that newly upgraded MFIs have been able to bring in, many 
formal banks are now interested in joining the party.  Downscaling is the practice of 
formal banks that extend their services to what was traditionally considered the 
                                                
6 A “double bottom line” refers to a company meeting both positive financial and social 
goals (Bernardez, 2009). 
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microfinance sector.  While instances of formal banks actually serving the microcredit 
market are few, their presence alone is enough to demonstrate that microfinance is 
growing its reach and popularity.  The goal of extending financial access to those who 
don’t have it is being realized.  Banks downscale for a variety of reasons.  Some banks 
see downscaling as a savvy opportunity to profit in a “niche” market.  Other banks see 
value in diversifying their products.  Also, microfinance borrowers have proven to be less 
likely to default even in times of wide scale financial crises (Von Stauffenberg, 2009).  
Some banks just see the social mission of providing financial access to the poor as reason 
enough to downscale.       
Both upgrading and downscaling of banks have been spurred on by the impressive 
returns yielded by the industry’s most successful MFIs.  In 2004, a study was conducted 
to assess the profitability of the microfinance industry and found that many MFIs were 
operating with profits near or above those of traditional banks (Barton, Herrero, Quelch, 
& Rangan, 2007).  The study took a three year mean from 2002 to 2004 and found that 
the average return on equity (ROE) of the top twelve performing MFIs in Latin America 
was over 33% and the highest was 52%.  To put this into perspective, the average ROE 
for formal banks over the same period was only 11%.  Seventeen MFIs boasted a ROE 
higher than those of Citigroup.  The consistency of MFIs to bring in returns like this has 
led to wider confidence and acceptance of the industry as part of the financial sector.  
Table 1 shows the average ROE of the twelve MFIs in the Barton et al. study over the 
2002-2004 time span.  Compartamos had the highest with an astonishing 52.2 percent.   
 
 
DOES MICROFINANCE REDUCE POVERTY? A STUDY OF LATIN AMERICA 15 
Table 1 
 
Top Performing MFIs in Latin America 
 
MFI Country Average ROE (Percent) 
Compartamos Mexico 52.2 
BancoSol Bolivia 26.3 
Credife (Banco de Pichincha)  Ecuador 50.9 
Confia Banco Procredit Nicaragua 39.3 
Banco del Trabajo Peru 33.8 
Findesa Nicaragua 32 
Fundacion WWB/Cali Colombia 31.5 
Edpyme Crear Arequipa Peru 29.7 
BanGente Venezuela 29 
Banco Solidario Ecuador 25.2 
FIE Bolivia 25.2 
Sogesol Haiti 23.4 
Traditional Banks   11.2 
Source: Marulanda and Otero, 2005; Worldscope.   
 
The Dark Side of Microfinance 
 As microfinance gained a higher profile in the last decade, studies have begun to 
doubt the industry’s mission and efficacy.  The increasing number of for-profit 
microfinance transactions has resulted in questionable practices.  As more and more 
institutions begin to use microfinance for profits, it begs the question whether these 
institutions are upholding the original aim of providing financial access to the poor.  
Beyond just access, the end goal is to improve the lives of the poor and help them pull 
themselves out of extreme poverty.  Today, microfinance has taken on a different 
appearance complete with loan sharks, usuriously high interest rates, and extreme social 
pressures. 
 Microfinance institutions have always charged high interest rates.  Most NGOs 
had to charge rates averaging about 30% in order to cover the risk of default and 
transaction costs (Epstein & Smith, 2007).  Since each loan is so small, the interest 
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payment must be proportionately larger in order to recover the administrative and 
informational costs.  Today, MFIs sometimes use this as an excuse to charge 
unreasonably high interest rates.  The interest rates charged by for-profit banks to 
microfinance borrowers range between 50 and 120 percent. Banks justify these interest 
rates by claiming that interest payments fund future outreach and allow them to expand to 
accommodate more people in poverty.  They also point out that the borrowers are made 
aware of the interest rates before they receive their loans and there continues to be 
growing demand for the loans.7  Lastly, banks justify their excessive interest rates by 
contrasting their rates to those of informal moneylenders and loan sharks that used to 
monopolize the market for loans to the poor.  Not only were these moneylenders 
dangerous, they also frequently charged interest rates of up to 300% (Epstein & Smith, 
2007). 
 As profits continue to rise, banks look to their own loan sharks to ensure that 
payments keep coming in and default stays low.  In some extreme cases, the microfinance 
loan sharks have been more vicious and detrimental than earlier moneylenders may have 
been.  Even the Grameen Bank has been accused of questionable practices after going 
public.  One former loan shark who retired early after speaking out against the Grameen’s 
practices claims he was forced to mistreat the borrowers.  His job was to intimidate and 
insult the borrowers and even was forced to encourage people to sell their clothes or their 
children (The crushing burden of microcredit, 2008).  Loan agents of Banco Azteca in 
Mexico have publicly shamed borrowers who were late on payments by posting their 
personal information with flyers that say “Do Not Lend to This Person” in public places 
                                                
7 See, however, Rosenberg (2007) points out that borrower demand does not necessarily 
indicate that they benefit.  People often make unwise decisions regarding credit. 
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(Epstein & Smith, 2007).  Social pressures like this and those associated with group 
lending can have disastrous effects on the lives of some poor who fall behind on their 
payments.  It is not uncommon for borrowers to take out loans from moneylenders to pay 
for their microfinance loans.  They pay for their credit with credit and are unable to 
escape the cycle.  In October 2010, 54 suicides were attributed to microfinance related 
pressures in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.  Some of the country’s most popular 
microfinance institutions have been cited for grossly mishandling their practices.8  The 
MFIs are accused of verbally harassing the families of the borrowers, using vulgar 
language towards the wives of the victims, and even demanded that one borrower repay 
his debt by prostituting his sixteen year old daughter (International Business Times, 
2010). 
 Another important caveat to the recent success of for-profit microfinance 
institutions is whether or not it is appropriate to be profiting from the poor.  While the 
high returns are great for shareholders, they are being generated by excessive interest 
rates paid by those who can least afford it.  Many in the microfinance industry are 
troubled by the fact that such large profits are being generated by the poor and transferred 
to Wall Street investors.  Profits mark the fundamental shift in purpose that many MFIs in 
the industry took while upgrading.  While extending financial access to the poor and 
alleviating poverty were once the primary foci of the microfinance industry, maximizing 
returns and profits are rapidly becoming just as, if not more, important for MFI managers.  
Mohammad Yunus has been highly critical of MFIs profiting from the poor and said: 
                                                
8 MFIs accused of contributing to the string of suicides include SKS Microfinance, 
Spandana Microfinance, SHARE, Asmitha, L&T’s microfinance and BASIX 
Microfinance. 
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“Microcredit should be seen as an opportunity to help people get out of poverty in a 
business way, but not as an opportunity to make money out of poor people” 
(MacFarquhar, 2010).  Another important criticism is that as profits are filtered off to 
Wall Street, they are being taken out of the communities in which they were generated.  
This result may even be worse than local moneylenders who would presumably spend 
their profits (albeit derived from usurious interest rates) back in the community, filtering 
back through and stimulating the local economy (Korten, 2011).     
 On the other hand, advocates of profit-generating MFIs argue that the poor are 
ultimately better off with their service.  One of the most important functions of the larger 
for-profit MFIs is that they are more financially stable, which enables them to broaden 
their reach.  They are able to provide regulated access to credit to more people living in 
poverty, which was always a focus of the industry.  One study by Gutierrez-Nieto, 
Serrano-Cinca, and Mar Molinero (2009) found that increased access to financial markets 
(particularly more efficient financial markets) is required to achieve social efficiency.  
This relationship can be seen in Figure 3.  Financial efficiency is measured along the x-
axis (ACE-WP) and social efficiency is measured along the y-axis (ACE-LR).  The data 
clearly demonstrates an upward trend indicating that as MFIs and the microfinance 
industry becomes more financially efficient, they are able to achieve higher social 
efficiency.9 
 
    
                                                
9 Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2009) explain social efficiency to be the second line of a double 
bottom line business.  They assess how MFIs perform in regard to their social efficiency 
using tools such as the social return on investment (SROI) and the CGAP’s Poverty 
Assessment Tool (PAT) among others. 
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Figure 3.  MFIs are plotted as points with their financial efficiency along the x-axis and 
social efficiency along the y-axis. 
 
Microfinance Does Not Reduce Poverty 
 Criticisms of microfinance extend beyond the bad practices and behavior of 
certain MFIs and question whether the industry is serving its purpose at all.  A number of 
scholars in the field posit that microfinance does not address the root of the problems the 
poor suffer from and rather addresses the symptoms.  Other critics suggest that 
microfinance hasn’t been and will not be a useful tool for poverty alleviation.  While it 
may be true that microfinance has been oversold as a panacea for poverty, that should not 
discredit its entire efficacy.   
         Wright (2000) asserts that microfinance addresses the symptoms of poverty 
and not the actual root of the problem.  He explains that microfinance cannot reasonably 
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address structural problems to economic development such as poor infrastructure, health 
services, or education systems.  Structural changes in these areas are required for large-
scale economic growth, which is not something that microfinance can provide.  Skeptics 
throughout the development field echo these sentiments.  Posner (2006) finds that 
microfinance success has been more of a case-by-case truth than a universal one.  He is 
skeptical of the idea that the poor can “borrow their way out of poverty” and suggests that 
it would be impossible for a nation to do so.  Becker (2006) supports this thought by 
asserting that economic growth is driven by improvements in education, fair government 
and regulations, strong property rights and openness to trade.  Microfinance cannot affect 
the structure of poverty the way changes in these things can.          
Perhaps surprisingly, some claim that microfinance has made women more 
vulnerable to domestic abuse.  One of the original goals of microfinance was to promote 
the status of women by lending to them almost exclusively.  What often occurs is the 
women receive the loan in name only and instead of using it for their own investment 
purposes, pass it off to their husbands to use (Wright, 2000).  Some argue, however, that 
even though women give their loans to their husbands to invest, it does not necessarily 
mean that women are giving up their power.  The women are still the ones who attend the 
training meetings that are mandatory for most MFIs and they are still in charge of the 
loan repayment.  Ultimately, women have the final say on who gets to do what with their 
loan since they are responsible for repayment and continuing the family’s access to 
credit.   
The most important criticism of microfinance to address is whether or not it 
works at all.  Some claim that the amalgamation of these draw backs has actually resulted 
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in a lower quality of life for the poor and has not done much, if anything at all, to 
alleviate poverty (Karlan & Zinman, 2007).  This is an important question to ask because 
so many of the world’s poor rely on microfinance.  What I intend to do next will examine 
the claim that microfinance has no effect on poverty and attempt to measure what effect 
microfinance has had on poverty rates in Latin America. 
Hypothesis 
Few people would suggest that microfinance is a cure all for poverty in the 
developing world.  While many have hyped the industry as revolutionary to development 
economics to the extent that it would bring about the end of extreme poverty, much of the 
euphoria has worn off.  Yunus (2007) recognizes that microfinance alone will not 
alleviate poverty, but asserts that it is an important tool in development economics to 
raise the poor up to a level where other development measures can pick up and have a 
more meaningful impact.  Klein (2008) finds that the positive effects of microfinance are 
best seen over longer spans of time.  He argues that financial access for the poor 
improves the overall well-being of households and reduces income inequality.  Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2005) report similar findings that financial development 
leads to more rapid economic growth and thereby reducing poverty, specifically when 
measured at the $1.25 and $2 a day poverty headcount ratios.    
Beck et al. (2005) also show that increased financial development has a 
disproportionately larger positive effect on the poor than it does for other demographics.  
Increased financial access is related to faster income growth for the poor, rapid narrowing 
of the poverty gap, and quicker decreases in the poverty rate.  Barr et al. (2007) point out 
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the social benefits to increased financial access for the poor such as credit, savings, risk 
management and payment services, all of which contribute to lower poverty rates.     
As previously stated, this case study will examine the effects of microfinance on 
poverty rates in Latin America.  This study aims to find empirical evidence to support the 
claim that microfinance is, in fact, lowering the poverty rate in the region.  The research 
will focus on microfinance activity and levels of extreme poverty as measured as the 
proportion of the population living at or below $2 a day and $1.25 a day. Since 
microfinance is directly aimed at the most poor, we should see the effects of increased 
microfinance activity best in these demographics.  Also, as these borrowers repay and 
gain positive credit histories and bonds with the MFIs, they can increase their loan sizes 
and pull themselves out of poverty.  Consistent with logic that supports the efforts of 
microfinance, the hypothesis posits that as microfinance activity increases, the number of 
people living in extreme poverty will decrease.  
Method 
 This study will examine the effect of microfinance on those living in extreme 
poverty in Latin America by performing a panel-data analysis to capture effects over time 
and across countries.  The data set includes data from 17 countries from Latin America 
and the Caribbean over the time span of 1996 to 2008.  The countries examined include 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and 
Venezuela.  
The Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX Market) provides high quality 
information and data on microfinance institutions from around the world.  They have 
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standardized the industry to make comparisons and benchmarking possible, and thus have 
overcome one of the greatest challenges of the industry (Mixmarket, 2007).  The data that 
this study uses provided by the MIX Market include total borrowings, gross loan 
portfolio, number of active borrowers, and the number of women borrowers for each of 
the countries listed above.10  Using this data, the study examines average loan size, the 
percent of borrowers who are women, the percent of the population who are borrowing 
microfinance loans, and the number of women borrowers as a percent of the population.11  
This data will be the primary benchmarks by which microfinance activity is measured 
and will provide insight into how microfinance is changing in relation to poverty. 
In order to measure microfinance’s impact on poverty, the study uses two separate 
poverty headcount ratios.  The poverty headcount ratio is used to measure extreme 
poverty in the developing world and is calculated as the proportion of the population that 
is living on less than $2 a day and $1.25 a day.  The World Bank publishes 
comprehensive yearly data in its World Development Indicators data set.  The data set 
includes the poverty headcount ratio at both the $2 and $1.25 a day levels for all of the 
countries listed above over the 1996-2008 time span.      
To control for other factors that may be causing economic growth and thereby 
reducing the poverty head count ratios, the study examines a diverse array of 
development indicators to represent different major structural contributors to 
development.  As suggested by many critics of microfinance, poverty is most affected by 
                                                
10 The MIX Market provides data on specific MFIs in each country.  In order to use the 
data in cross-country analysis, total borrowings, gross loan portfolio, total borrowers and 
total women borrowers were summed together from each individual MFI. 
11 Data on average loan sizes was generated by dividing  total borrowings by the number 
of active borrowers.   
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education, government regulation, and the health of the local economy.  For this, the 
study also uses the World Development Indicators database for the following variables: 
the cost to start a business (as a percent of GNI per capita), the expenditure on secondary 
education (as a percent of GDP per capita), the female labor participation rate (as a 
percent of the female population), the lending interest rate (as a percent), expenditure on 
research and development (as a percent of GDP), the time required to enforce a contract 
(number of days) and the perception of crime as a constraint to business (as a percent of 
managers surveyed).  
Empirical Model 
 This study uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) panel regressions to examine how 
microfinance affects poverty across countries over time.  The 17-country data set 
includes nations all from the Latin America and Caribbean region. There are, however, 
vast differences among the countries in terms of development.  It is reasonable to suspect, 
then, that changes in certain development indicators and microfinance activity may not 
affect all countries in similar ways.  To account for some of these differences, we split the 
countries into two sub-groups by their wealth.  The World Bank separates countries into 
four wealth categories: Low Income, Lower Middle Income, Upper Middle Income, and 
High Income.  The categories are determined by GNI per capita and each of the countries 
in this data set fall into the two Middle Income levels.  The Upper Middle Income set is 
defined as countries with GNIs per capita between $12,195 - $3,946 and comprises 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru and Venezuela.  The Lower Middle Income set is defined as countries with GNIs 
per capita between $3,945 - $996 and comprises Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
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Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay.  Figure 4 shows how the countries are 
divided into the two income sub-groups. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  This map shows the locations of Upper Middle Income Countries (left) and 
Lower Middle Income Countries (right). 
 
 The poverty headcount ratios at the $2 a day (PHCR_2) and the $1.25 a day 
(PHCR_125) levels are used as the dependent variables.12 Once the countries were 
divided into two sub-groups, we ran panel-data OLS regressions for each sub-group at 
both poverty headcount ratios.  Table 2 shows the summary statistics.  The proportion of 
the population living in extreme poverty at both levels is, on average, much higher in the 
Lower Middle Income countries. 
 
                                                
12 The data for the poverty headcount ratios was incomplete.  Data was often recorded 
every other year for this variable.  In order to allow for more observations, we filled in 
the missing data with the averages of the preceding and succeeding years. 
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Table 2 
 
Poverty Headcount Ratio 
 
Upper Middle Income  
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PHCR @ $2 (% of pop) 130 16.35869 7.582142 2.38 31.66 
PHCR @ $1.25 (% of pop) 130 7.854477 4.762913 2 18.41 
      
Lower Middle Income 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PHCR @ $2 (% of pop) 91 27.26957 6.244769 12.82 38.47 
PHCR @ $1.25 (% of pop) 91 15.16759 4.501718 4.69 24.7 
 
Each regression included some measure of microfinance activity.  The 
microfinance independent variables include the average loan size per borrower as 
calculated as total borrowings divided by the number of active borrowers (AvgBorrow) 
and another proxy as calculated as the gross loan portfolio of MFIs in a country divided 
by the number of active borrowers (GLoan_Borrow).  The former is a closer 
approximation of the average loan size per borrower; however, there were much fewer 
observations available than the latter.  We assume that the (GLoan_Borrow) variable is a 
close proxy for average loan size per borrower because it is in the interest of MFIs to lend 
the full extent of their portfolios.  Potential borrowers cannot benefit from excess 
portfolios if they are not given the money to invest and MFIs cannot benefit from interest 
rates if the money is not being lent out.  By accounting for average loan size per 
borrower, we are trying to measure the possibility of economies of scale in the industry.  
As we already have indicated, as borrowers make timely repayments on their initial loans 
and build a credit history with their MFIs, they are approved for increasingly larger loans.  
The sizes of the loans are important to examine because it represents an increase in 
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income to the borrowers, directly affecting poverty rates.  Figure 5 shows time series data 
of average microloan sizes for a selection of countries from this data set from 2002 to 
2008.13  As the chart shows, the average loan size per borrower has been increasing 
quickly and steadily in the last decade.  There is a clear upward trend in the data, which 
could signify economies of scale in the microfinance industry.    
 
Figure 5.  Average loan size per borrower in Latin America from 2002 to 2008. 
 
The next microfinance-specific independent variable measures the percent of 
borrowers who are women, (Percent_women_borrowers). The study also uses two 
measures that capture the proportion of the overall population using microfinance loans.  
The (Log_micro_activity) variable is defined as the logarithm of the number of 
microfinance borrowers divided by the country’s total population.  Similarly, the 
(Log_womenmicro) variable is defined as the logarithm of the number of female 
                                                
13 The average loan size here is calculated as total borrowings divided by the total 
number of active borrowers.   
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microfinance borrowers divided by the entire population.14  These variables will attempt 
to measure the scale to which microfinance is being utilized.   
It is important also to think about the effects of a rapid increase of microfinance 
borrowers on the average loan size of a region.  Since we know that first time borrowers 
are typically offered smaller loans compared to more frequent borrowers, we should 
expect average loan sizes to be pulled down by an influx of new borrowers.  Lets look 
again to average loan sizes in Brazil, now in Figure 6.  In 2005, average loan size in the 
country dips drastically and then is followed by sharp increases over the next two years. 
 
Figure 6.  Average loan size and total borrowers in Brazil from 2003 to 2008. 
 
The dip corresponds to a tremendous increase in the number of borrowers in the country 
and the rapid rise in the average loan size corresponds with a rapid decrease in the 
                                                
14 We use the log of these variables because they are not linearly related to the poverty 
headcount ratios.  This makes intuitive sense because microfinance has been growing so 
rapidly and it is likely that its presence spread as more people understood what it is and 
saw people in their towns benefiting.  
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number of borrowers.  The total number of borrowers seems to be weighing down the 
average loan size.  As the microfinance industry grows, it is possible that the numbers are 
masking the success of some borrowers who are achieving economies of scale with 
growing loans and micro businesses.    
Table 3 
 
Summary Statistics of Microfinance Variables 
 
Upper Middle Income  
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Average Borrowings 64 565.7257 558.8124 42.3071 2280.2 
      
Women (Percent of 
Borrowers)   96 0.5267082 0.224919 0 1 
      
Gross Loan Portfolio per 
Borrower 96 1082.17 924.3376 54.3543 4448.35 
 
Women Borrowers / 
Population 92 0.0049309 0.0077183 0.0000193 0.038585 
 
Borrowers / Population 96 0.0100243 0.0175254 0.0000475 0.0936307 
            
Lower Middle Income 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Average Borrowings 47 335.3939 212.3253 20.4176 830.563 
 
Women (Percent of 
Borrowers)   79 0.5375118 0.2395491 0 1 
 
Gross Loan Portfolio per 
Borrower 79 757.7692 446.1072 50.872 1884.49 
 
Women Borrowers / 
Population 74 0.0136528 0.0136895 4.15E-06 0.0546495 
 
Borrowers / Population 79 0.0227548 0.0232789 8.31E-06 0.0949444 
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Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the microfinance variables used in this 
study and is broken down by income group.  As might be expected, levels of both 
average borrowings and gross loan portfolio per borrower are higher for borrowers in the 
Upper Middle Income countries.  Also, the Lower Middle Income countries boast higher 
proportions of the female and total borrowers to the total population.  This follows the 
logic that a lower percentage of the population needs to use microfinance to access 
financial markets.  Finally, the percent of women borrowers at any MFI is near the same 
in both country groups, since there wouldn’t seem to be a reason for lower or higher 
income countries to treat women borrowers any differently. 
 The regression analysis uses a number of development indicators as independent 
variables to account for other sources that may be driving down the poverty headcount 
ratios.  The first variable is expenditure on secondary education as a percent of GDP, 
(Ed_Expend_2).  The next is the percent of GDP spent on research and development in 
each country (RnD).  These measures represent investments in human capital, which is a 
driving factor in economic development.  The variable (Startup_Cost) measures the 
average cost to start a business as a percent of GNI per capita.  The variable 
(LendInterestRate) is each country’s lending interest rate in percent as provided by the 
World Bank.  (WLaborforce) measures the female labor participation rate as a percent of 
the female population.  These variables capture aspects of market health in each country. 
(ContractEnforce) is defined as the number of days required to enforce a contract.  And 
finally, (BCrime) is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if more that 25 percent of 
managers in a country feel that crime was a constraint to business and 0 if otherwise.  
These variables capture the role of the government in fostering an economic environment 
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conducive to growth and activity.  Controlling crime and establishing efficient legal 
structures are the responsibility of the government and essential to economic growth.   
Table 4 
 
Summary Statistics of Development Indicator Variables 
 
Upper Middle Income  
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Startup Cost (GNI per 
Capita) 60 20.21 9.206404 7.5 43.9 
 
Expenditure on Secondary 
Ed. (% GDP per capita) 70 13.82599 4.328498 3.35047 23.1654 
 
Female Labor Participation 
Rate (% of female pop) 130 45.47462 6.857286 33 59.9 
 
Lending Interest Rate (%) 129 23.2975 15.89931 5.127 86.3633 
 
R & D (% of GDP) 75 0.4015231 0.2264645 0.082205 1.02321 
 
Time Req. to Enforce a 
Contract (Days) 60 658.25 272.3559 415 1510 
            
Lower Middle Income 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Startup Cost (GNI per 
Capita) 42 97.10952 49.16018 29.2 209.9 
 
Expenditure on Secondary 
Ed. (% GDP per capita) 34 9.146329 4.31626 1.08183 18.4459 
 
Female Labor Participation  
Rate (% of female pop) 91 46.66154 7.278946 33.7 62.1 
 
Lending Interest Rate (%) 82 22.40166 10.70412 9.61947 55.9667 
 
R & D (% of GDP) 30 0.1258167 0.1012095 0.034903 0.325442 
 
Time Req. to Enforce a 
Contract (Days) 42 781.4286 305.9536 540 1459 
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Table 4 shows the summary statistics for each development indicator variable and 
divides them into the two income sub-groups.  The variables that measure human capital, 
R & D and Expenditure on secondary education, were on average higher in the Upper 
Middle Income countries, as should be expected.  Lending interest rates and female labor 
participation rates were about equal on average for the two sets.  However, the variable 
that measures business start up costs shows great variation between sub-groups.  Since 
the variable is measured as a percent of GNI per capita, the data suggest that starting a 
business would cost an average of 97 percent of per capita income in the Lower Middle 
Income set as opposed to just 20 percent in the Upper Income set.  This means that 
starting a business is a much greater undertaking for the average person in lower income 
countries and is possibly a constraint to growth.  The time required to enforce a contract 
is also longer on average in the lower income countries, which can make business 
ownership and economic activity more arduous.  Although not listed in Table 4, it is 
important to note that the variable (BCrime) takes a value of 1 for two of the ten 
countries in the Upper Middle Income set.15  By contrast, the variable takes a value of 1 
for five of the seven countries in the Lower Middle Income set.   
This set of variables is has been greatly trimmed down from the original set.  We 
ran preliminary regression with a number of different proxies for the different types of 
structural development.  The variables presented in this paper were consistently more 
statistically significant and remained in the final results.  Among the variables that did 
not prove to be significant that are worth noting include growth in GDP, inflation, 
remittance payments, foreign direct investment, unemployment, and the percent of the 
                                                
15 In 2003, 80 percent of managers in Guatemala surveyed by the World Bank felt crime 
was a serious constraint to business. 
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population working in the industry, service, and agricultural sectors.  The variables 
initially tested are not limited to this list.  These other development indicators did not 
prove to be statistically significant.   
 Results 
 Using the variables outlined above, we run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) panel 
regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  We run four separate sets of 
regressions as the data is separated into two income categories and we examine two 
distinct levels of extreme poverty (poverty headcount ratio at $2 and $1.25).  Tables 5 
through 9 show the results. 
Table 5 shows the models estimating the effects of microfinance on the $2 
Poverty HCR for Upper Middle Income Countries.  Both microfinance variables, 
(GLoan_Borrow) and (Log_womenmicro), have negative coefficients that are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that a dollar increase in the gross 
loan portfolio per borrower will decrease the poverty HCR by .00317 percent (Model 3).  
Also, as the number of women borrowers as a proportion of the population increases, the 
proportion of the population in extreme poverty at the $2 level decreases.  Similarly, the 
coefficients on the human capital variables, (RnD) and (Ed_Expend_2), are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level indicating that an increase in human capital leads 
to a decrease in the poverty HCR.  As in Model 3, a 1% increase in the amount invested 
in R & D results in a 10.89 percent decline in the $2 poverty HCR.  Also, a 1% increase 
in expenditure on secondary education results in a .957 percent decrease in the $2 poverty 
HCR.  A 1% increase in the lending interest rate increases the poverty rate by 0.115 
percent (Model 3).  The time required to enforce a contract increases the poverty HCR by 
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.0189 percent (Model 3) for an increase in one day.  Finally the (Wlaborforce) variable 
increases the poverty HCR by .189 percent (Model 3) for a 1% increase in women 
participating in the labor force.  These coefficients were all statistically significant.   
Table 5 
 
OLS Regressions of Poverty HCR at $2 for Upper Middle Income 
Countries 
Dependent variable: PHCR_2     
Model (1) (2) (3) 
    
GLoan_Borrow -0.00361*** -0.00377*** -0.00317*** 
 (-4.15) (-5.66) (-5.46) 
    
RnD -13.32*** -15.18*** -10.89*** 
 (-7.45) (-14.81) (-5.11) 
    
LendInterestRate 0.190*** 0.217*** 0.115** 
 (-4.82) (-11.94) (-2.73) 
    
Ed_Expend_2 -0.862*** -0.834*** -0.957*** 
 (-13.08) (-9.76) (-9.69) 
    
ContractEnforce 0.0162*** 0.0165*** 0.0189*** 
 (-10.57) (-22.99) (-18.6) 
    
Log_womenmicro  -0.537*** -0.478*** 
  (-3.35) (-4.73) 
    
Wlaborforce   0.189** 
   (-2.58) 
    
_cons 22.18*** 18.66*** 9.780** 
  (-14.27) (-14.81) (-2.61) 
Summary Statistics       
R-sq within .8369 .8195 .8520 
R-sq between .9826 .9971 .9992 
R-sq overall .9619 .9776 .9853 
N 19 19 19 
Note: t statistics in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table 6 
 
OLS Regressions of Poverty HCR at $1.25 for Upper Middle Income 
Countries 
Dependent variable: PHCR_125     
Model (4) (5) (6) 
    
GLoan_Borrow -0.00175*** -0.00194*** -0.00175*** 
 (-9.49) (-6.79) (-9.74) 
    
RnD -4.777*** -2.663*** -3.016*** 
 (-3.51) (-4.75) (-12.17) 
    
Ed_Expend_2 -0.693*** -0.567*** -0.697*** 
 (-7.38) (-14.10) (-10.16) 
    
ContractEnforce 0.0120*** 0.0139*** 0.0141*** 
 (-7.49) (-36.63) (-40.43) 
    
Wlaborforce  0.159*** 0.147*** 
  (-9.03) (-7.24) 
    
Log_womenmicro   -0.372** 
   (-2.75) 
    
_cons 12.82*** 1.751 1.565 
 (-9.1) (-1.25) (-1.12) 
Summary Statistics       
R-sq within .8388 .7810 .8546 
R-sq between .9063 .9972 .9972 
R-sq overall .9016 .9722 .9837 
N 19 19 19 
Note: t statistics in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
 
Table 6 estimates the effects of similar variables at the $1.25 poverty HCR also 
for the Upper Middle Income countries.  Consistent with the findings above, the 
microfinance and human capital variables yield statistically significant negative 
coefficients that suggest decreases in the poverty rate.  A one-dollar increase in 
(GLoan_Borrow) decreases the poverty HCR at $1.25 by .00175 percent (Model 6).  
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One percent increases in (RnD) and (Ed_Expend_2) result in 3.016 percent and .697 
percent decreases in the poverty HCR (Model 6).  The time required to enforce a contact 
increase the poverty HCR by .0141 percent per extra day required (Model 6).   Again, 
women’s increased participation in the labor force increases the poverty rate by .147 
percent (Model 6).   
Table 7 
 
OLS Regressions of Poverty HCR at $2 for Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Dependent variable: PHCR_2     
Model (7) (8) (9) 
    
GLoan_Borrow -0.00730*** -0.0061 -0.0062 
 (-3.75) (-1.54) (-1.63) 
    
Startup_Cost 0.0532* 0.0556 0.048 
 (-2.38) (-1.77) (-1.59) 
    
Ed_Expend_2  -0.755*** -0.665*** 
  (-4.45) (-4.07) 
    
Log_womenmicro   -0.668* 
   (-2.42) 
    
_cons 26.48*** 31.41*** 28.85*** 
 (-9.07) (-5.64) (-4.45) 
Summary Statistics       
R-sq within 0.8178 0.9025 0.9134 
R-sq between 0.3758 0.5207 0.4244 
R-sq overall 0.4879 0.7013 0.6395 
N 42 18 18 
t statistics in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 
Table 7 shows the results for the regressions run on the $2 Poverty HCR for the 
Lower Middle Income Countries.  In this group, microfinance is measured by the 
(GLoan_Borrow) variable.  This variable also results in a decrease in the poverty rate.  
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A one-dollar increase in average borrowings decreases the poverty rates by .0073 percent 
(Model 7).  The other microfinance variable included, (Log_womenmicro), also yields a 
negative coefficient (Model 9).  To measure human capital in this group we use 
(Ed_Expend_2), which causes a .665 decrease in the poverty rate with a 1% increase 
(Model 9).  Conversely, as the cost to start a business as a percent of GNI per capita 
increases by 1%, the poverty rate increases by .0532 percent (Model 7).    
Table 8 shows the results of the final regression set that measures the effects on 
the poverty at the $1.25 level for the Lower Income Countries.  The microfinance 
measures continue to be statistically significant and decrease the poverty rate as 
microfinance grows.  A dollar increase in (AvgBorrow) from Model 11 decreases the 
poverty rate by .0096 percent.  In Model 11, a 1% increase in the percent of borrowers 
who are women decreases poverty by .1012 percent.  In the same model, a change in 
(Log_micro_activity) results in a 2.26 percent decrease in the poverty rate.  Changes in 
secondary education spending have the greatest impact on the poverty rate of any group 
as a 1% increase in education expenditure results in a 1.39 percent decrease in the 
poverty rate (Model 11).  Again, the labor force participation rate of women plays a 
significant role and yields a 1.084 percent increase in the poverty rate for a corresponding 
1% increase in labor force participation.  (LendInterestRate) also yields a statistically 
significant increase in the poverty rate as it increases.  A 1% increase in the lending 
interest rate results in a .163 percent increase in the poverty HCR.   
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Table 8 
 
OLS Regressions of Poverty HCR at $1.25 for Lower Middle Countries 
Dependent variable: PHCR_125   
Model (10) (11) 
   
Log_micro_activity -1.557*** -2.266*** 
 (-3.46) (-3.69) 
   
Percent_women_borrowers -0.06602* -0.1012*** 
 (-1.97) (-4.92) 
   
Ed_Expend_2 -1.068*** -1.391*** 
 (-3.79) (-5.45) 
   
WLaboreforce 0.968*** 1.084*** 
 (-6.1) (-5.69) 
   
AvgBorrow  0.00967* 
  (-2.25) 
   
LendInterestRate  0.163* 
  (-2.35) 
   
_cons -26.61*** -35.85*** 
  (-4.03) (-4.15) 
Summary Statistics     
R-sq within 0.1382 0.306 
R-sq between 0.6251 0.8085 
R-sq overall 0.6105 0.6876 
N 32 26 
t statistics in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
 
Discussion 
 The results are largely consistent with the hypothesis presented earlier.  
Microfinance does have a statistically significant effect on reducing poverty at both the 
$2 and $1.25 a day levels.  Other important development indicators also yield results that 
suggest important implications for poverty rates.  The results show that microfinance 
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makes a substantial contribution to decreasing poverty when combined with other, more 
structural, contributors to economic development.  Human capital, healthy markets, and 
sensible government regulations also have significant roles in development in this study.   
 Comparing the coefficients of the different variables is a bit difficult.  The 
coefficients on the human capital variables appear to signal a much larger effect on 
reducing poverty than different measures of microfinance do.  However, (RnD) and 
(Ed_Expend_2) are measured in percent of GDP per capita.  Obviously, a 1% change in 
either of these variables will yield a much larger effect on poverty than a one-dollar 
change in average loan size per borrower or gross loan portfolio per borrower.  The 
amount of money spent to increase either (RnD) or (Ed_Expend_2) by 1% is enormous 
compared to the one-dollar change in the average loan size variables.  For this reason, the 
coefficients on the microfinance variables should not be written off as “too small” to have 
a real impact.  Average loan sizes have been increasing steadily in Latin America over 
the last decade on a scale that would make an important contribution to the decline in 
poverty rates.16     
 Consistent through each group, the variables that account for market health have 
positive coefficients.  The intuition here is easy to follow.  Increases in the lending 
interest rate can cause more poverty for a number of reasons.  It makes it more costly to 
run businesses and can be prohibitively costly for small and micro enterprises.  It also 
disincentivizes taking out loans or limits financial market access, which as we have seen 
is an important factor for development and poverty reduction.  As business start-up costs 
increase, this should also increase the poverty rate and the models reflect that.  High start 
                                                
16 See Figure 5. 
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up costs limit the number of people who can afford to start their own business and grow 
their wealth.  The time required to enforce a contract can also hinder economic growth if 
the duration is too long.  It is the responsibility of governments to build a functioning and 
efficient framework in which economic development can occur.  Increases in the number 
of days required to enforce a contract result in higher poverty rates.  Interestingly, the 
variable that measures women’s labor force participation is positively correlated with the 
poverty headcount ratio.  This suggests that as the percentage of women working 
increases, so too does the poverty rate.  This may be explained by the intuition that 
women are relied upon even more to work when a family is living in extreme poverty.  
Not unlike the economic situation of the settlers in America’s western frontier, the 
women’s work is essential to survival in desperate conditions.  These variables represent 
the “structural” aspects of an economy that many suggest are the only way to combat 
poverty.  Including these variables in the regressions is essential to control for structural 
changes that may also be affecting poverty.   
Conclusions 
 Microfinance is not a panacea for global poverty.  While the industry was 
occasionally extolled as the end of poverty as we know it, few studies and development 
economists would support the claim.  Microfinance is, however, an important first step to 
alleviating poverty.  
Some have suggested that microfinance can never have more than a small impact 
on poverty.  When compared to large changes in structural factors of economic 
development such as infrastructure and human capital, this is likely correct.  However, 
microfinance can be interpreted as an important structural change in economic 
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development for the poor.  Microfinance opens up opportunities for credit to entire 
populations that had previously never had access.  Even though the industry was 
spearheaded by NGOs, it still fundamentally changed the economic conditions of the 
poor. 
The most difficult aspect to lowering extreme poverty is getting over the hump, 
out of the poverty trap.  The trap that exists is the lack of access to formal banking 
institutions.  The poor are cut off from the formal economy and forced to live in their 
own economic spheres.  While large scale structural changes in infrastructure, 
government regulation and human capital can help the country as a whole develop, those 
benefits do not necessarily trickle down to those living on less than $2 and $1.25 a day.  
Microfinance has started the processes of integrating the poor into the rest of the 
economy.  Upgraded MFIs and downscaling commercial banks are finally beginning to 
bridge the gap between the formal and informal economies.   
As mentioned earlier, upgraded and downscaled microfinance brings up the 
important ethical question of profiting from the poor.  What have been most troubling are 
not slightly higher interest rates, it has been questionable practices and usurious interest 
rates on many MFIs.  Loan sharks and social pressures have escalated, causing problems 
for microfinance borrowers.  Public shamings and suicides have headlined recent news 
about MFI practices.  Borrowers are taking loans out from moneylenders to pay for their 
microloans.  Profits that are generated locally are now being whisked away to Wall Street 
investors instead of filtering back into the local economy.  Any number of criticisms can 
be made about the practices of some for-profit microfinance institutions, but that should 
not spoil the benefits of the industry on the whole.  While it may be true that some 
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families and borrowers have been made worse off, microfinance continues to be a 
positive force in the lives of many. 
Regardless of the criticisms of the practices of certain MFIs, the important 
question to ask is, does it work?  Is microfinance actually making a contribution to the 
global decrease in poverty or is it just making marginal improvements in the daily lives 
of some borrowers?  This study found that microfinance has had a significant impact on 
poverty rates in Latin America and the Caribbean.  The effects may certainly be smaller 
than the effects of large-scale structural economic changes, but they are nevertheless 
important in reducing poverty.  As microfinance continues to grow and reach more of the 
world’s poor, it will give them an opportunity to take charge of their own economic 
situation and work their way out of poverty.  
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